经济管理学院“湖畔问道·鼎新论坛”讲座：金融科技与关系银行是合作伙伴还是竞争对手？

讲座题目

Fintech and Relationship Banking: partners or rivals?

主讲人

（单位）

Kent Matthews

(英国卡迪夫大学)

主持人

（单位）

尹威

（东南大学）

讲座时间

2026年11月3日

上午9点

讲座地点

综合楼305

主讲人简介

Kent Matthews是英国卡迪夫大学商学院金融学教授，同时拥有英国Sir Julian Hodge Professor of Banking and Finance的荣誉头衔。他从事银行与金融方面研究与研究三十余年，出版专著17本，主持各项科研项目13项，发表期刊论文近百篇，其中大部分发表于European Economic Review，Journal of Money, Credit and Banking，Journal of Bank and Finance，International Review of Financial Analysis和Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money等相关专业顶级期刊上。Kent Matthews教授在全球银行与金融研究领域拥有极高的声望，同时也是中国银行业研究专家，是国家自然科学基金委“中英合作项目”专家之一。他曾参与英国国家经济与社会研究所和英格兰银行的政策制定研究，也曾担任香港金融管理局的访问学者。

讲座内容摘要

The extant research has established that FinTech platforms serve the underbanked, provide credit to risky borrowers excluded by conventional banks, and act as a substitute for bank credit to SMEs. Little has been researched if how FinTech platforms and digital banking have displaced relationship banking. Banks utilize AI technology to enhance the onboarding customer experience of SME loan applicants and improve the speed of decision making. In this lecture, I will explore how banks use digital processes to reduce operational costs to offset the riskiness of SME lending and reach an optimal level of exposure to higher risk small ticket loans. Beyond an optimal threshold, banks activate traditional relationship lending to reduce the frictions associated with access to finance by SMEs. Here I will present empirical evidence from China on the probability of credit access by SMEs for small ticket loans using FinTech platforms and digital banking and to identify the threshold value of bank loans that activates relationship banking. I argue that banks use the digital banking mechanism as a screening process to identify lower risk SME borrowers. It is not appropriate to think of FinTech and digital banking as substitutes for relationship banking in the temporal dimension, but it is appropriate to think of FinTech and digital banking as inter-temporal complements to medium sized loans. The potential for gaming the system by Saints (low risk borrowers) and Sinners (high risk borrowers) may arise. This could make a post-screening equilibrium unstable, which may give rise to further deployment of AI to use the screening process to identify Saints from Sinners and Sinners pretending to be Saints.